Brorsen, B. WadeCoulibaly, NouhounRichter, Francisca G. C.Bailey, DeeVon2015-10-162015-10-162001-07Brorsen, B. W., Coulibaly, N., Richter, F. G. C., & Bailey, D. (2001). Feeder cattle price slides. Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 26(1), 291-308.http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14446/19783A theoretical model is developed to explain the economics of determining price slides for feeder cattle. The contract is viewed as a dynamic game with continuous strategies where the buyer and seller are the players. The model provides a solution for the price slide that guarantees an unbiased estimate of cattle weight. An empirical model using Superior Livestock Auction (SLA) data shows price slides used are smaller than those needed to cause the producer to give unbiased estimates of weight. Consistent with the model's predictions, producers slightly underestimate cattle weights.application/pdfThis material has been previously published. In the Oklahoma State University Library's institutional repository this version is made available through the open access principles and the terms of agreement/consent between the author(s) and the publisher. The permission policy on the use, reproduction or distribution of the material falls under fair use for educational, scholarship, and research purposes. Contact Digital Resources and Discovery Services at lib-dls@okstate.edu or 405-744-9161 for further information.Articleasymmetric informationfeeder cattlegame theoryprice slide